We present a new abstraction refinement algorithm to better refine the abstract model for formal property verification. In previous work, refinements are selected either based on a set of counter examples of the current abstract model, as in
INTRODUCTION
Formal property verification exhaustively verifies logic designs against some desired properties of the designs with respect to all possible input sequences of any length. In this paper we focus on the verification of safety properties. Informally, safety properties specify that some "bad" states are not reachable from the initial states through any traces of the design. A counter example of a safety property is a trace that reaches a bad state from an initial state of the design.
Without abstraction, state-of-the-art formal property verification engines based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD's) [16] or clauses in Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers [15] usually cannot verify properties of designs with more than a couple of hundred registers. As a result, formal property verification relies on automatic abstraction techniques to verify real-world logic designs.
Interpolation-based reachability analysis [14] and abstraction refinement [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [17] [19] [20] are commonly viewed as the most practical automatic abstraction methods. Interpolationbased reachability analysis uses a SAT solver to compute the interpolants of two Boolean formulas derived from the boundedmodel-checking formula in [3] on the whole design as a conservative abstraction of the set of reachable states from the initial states of the design.
Abstraction refinement incrementally refines the abstract model, a subset of the design, by including more and more logic from the original design until the underlying formal property verification engine verifies or falsifies the property. More precisely, the generic abstraction refinement algorithm is as follows.
1. Generate the abstract model. 2. Prove the property or search for a counter example on the abstract model; if the property is proven for the abstract model, stops (it is proven for the original design). 3. Use the counter example found on the abstract model to guide the search of a counter example on the original design; if a counter example is found, stops (the property is falsified for the original design). 4 . Refine the abstract model by adding more details to the abstract model; go back to Step 1.
Figure 1 Abstraction refinement algorithm
Since the performance of an underlying formal property verification engine decreases as the complexity of the abstract model increases, the biggest challenge of an abstraction refinement algorithm is to buildup an abstract model that is as simple as possible but contains enough details to verify the property. Therefore, Step 4 is usually an abstraction refinement algorithm's key differentiator, since it determines if the property can be proven at Step 2 or falsified at Step 3.
In this paper we present a new algorithm to improve Step 4. In previous work, the refinement schemes are computed either based on a set of counter examples of the current abstract model as in [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [19] [20] or independent of any counter examples of the current abstract model as in [17] . We introduce (1) a counterexample independent "controllability" analysis, (2) a counterexample dependent "cooperativeness" analysis and (3) combine both methods to better refine the abstract model.
interpolation-based reachability analysis in [14] . Experimental results indicate that the new method outperforms the other three methods in terms of runtime, abstraction efficiency (how much of the design is required to prove the properties, as defined in [19] ) and the number of proven properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some terminology before we present the algorithm in Section 3. We survey the related work in Section 4. We present the experimental results in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
We define in this section the syntax and semantics of designs and properties and the k-controllability and k-cooperativeness. 
Designs and Safety Properties

K-Controllability and KCooperativeness
To define k-controllability and k-cooperativeness, we first introduce the notion of k-dominancy. Let ( , ) C V T′ = be an abstract model of the design D. We say that a subset Q of the inputs of C is k-dominant for the abstract model C and the property P if for any partial input trace 0 ,... 
of the core not driven by the shield (e.g., inputs q1 and q2 in Figure 2 ) is k-controlling for the partitioned abstract model C if (1) the set ( ) ( ) c s Q C R C ∩ of inputs of the core driven by the shield (e.g., inputs r1 and r2 in Figure 2 ) is not k-dominant for the core c C but (2) the set
c C In the 2-player game scenario, suppose that the players played the game on the core and player 2 was controlling the set of inputs driven by the shield and lost because the set ( ) ( )
If player 2 gets to pick one additional input to control in a new game, then player 2 will be able to win the new game if and only if she picks a k-controlling input. Note that kcontrollability is counter-example independent.
c s C C C V T′ = = and the property P if (1) there is an input
of C violating the property P and (2) the partial trace ε is invalid on the abstract model ( , { }).
On the one hand, the k-controllability estimates the potential of a variable in invalidating counter examples if it was under full control of player 2 (but in reality, the transition function, not player 2, controls the behavior of the variable). On the other hand, the k-cooperativeness demonstrates that the transition function is cooperative with player 2 on invalidating some counter examples. Variables that are both k-controlling and k-cooperative have the potential and seem to be willing to help prove the property. Therefore we want to include their transition functions to refine the abstract model.
ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT ALGORITHM
Our algorithm aims to do a better job in Step 4 of the generic abstraction refinement algorithm in Figure 1 . The first three steps of our abstraction refinement algorithm are the same as the RFN method in [20] . In Step 1, the abstract model initially contains only the fail variable and its transition function. In
Step 2 RFN applies a hybrid ATPG-BDD method to find a set of counter examples represented by a sequence of cubes (partial input vectors). If the property is True for the abstract model, RFN reports that the property is True for the design and terminates. Otherwise in Step 3 RFN uses the counter example found on the abstract model to guide sequential ATPG to search for a counter example on the design. If such a counter example is found, RFN reports that the property is False, reports the counter example and terminates. Otherwise RFN proceeds to Step 4.
In the rest of the section, we will discuss how to compute kcontrollability and k-cooperativeness and use them to better refine the abstract model in Step 4.
Computing k-Controllability
Let ( , ) C V T′ = be an abstract model, let Q be a subset of inputs of the C, and let φ be a Boolean formula representing a set of states of the abstract model. We define the controllable predecessor predicate to be the following Boolean predicate: Knowing how to check whether a set of inputs is k-dominant we can determine if a variable
We implemented the above algorithm using the CUDD [18] package. We simplify each predicate i X by treating the states that are not reachable from the initial state in k-i steps as don't cares in the BDD operations. The predicate that represents the set of reachable states of the abstract model C can be computed by a BDD-based forward image computation from the initial state.
Computing k-Cooperativeness
Given an abstract model C and a partial trace 0 δ ,..., k s s = that represents a set of counter examples of C for P, we identify a subset of the k-cooperative inputs of C by performing 3-value simulation on the design. The advantage of 3-value simulation is that the runtime is linear in the size of the design times the length k of the partial trace. We use the unknown value X to overapproximate the value of a variable that is of value either 0 or 1. As a result, we may not identify all k-cooperative inputs.
We arrange the design so that the registers and inputs of the design are on the left and the next-state registers are on the right. At the i-th step of the 3-value simulation, for each 0,. The k-cooperative variables are ranked and placed in a priority queue first by their frequencies of appearances, the number of conflicts that they introduced in the counter example (the higher the better); then by sequential distances, the least number of registers on a path between the variable and the fail variable (the less the better); and finally by input widths, the number of inputs that appear in the BDD representation of the transition function of the variable (the fewer the better). We will use this priority queue in the following abstraction refinement algorithm.
Abstraction Refinement
In Step 4, we have a set of counter examples for the abstract model C represented by a partial trace 0 δ ,..., k s s = of length k.
We maintain the abstract model ( , )
c s C C C = in the form of a partitioned abstract model. We select exactly one transition function to be included in the abstract model in every iteration of the abstraction refinement algorithm. This differs from RFN, which may add multiple transition functions in an iteration.
We first compute the priority queue of the k-cooperative variables using the simulation-based method in Section 3.2. Before the property is proven, the queue is seldom empty in our experience. If the queue is indeed empty, we apply the netlist-topology based BFS method in [11] to select an input of the core that is not driven by the shield as our variable for refinement. We then add the transition function of the chosen variable to the shield of the abstract model.
Otherwise the priority queue of k-cooperative variables is not empty and we search for a k-controlling variable among the first three variables in the queue using the BDD-based method in Section 3.1. The first k-controlling variable of the top three kcooperative variables becomes our variable for refinement. In our experience, there is a good chance (greater than 30%) finding such a refinement variable at each iteration of the abstraction refinement algorithm. We then add the transition function of the refinement variable to the shield of the abstract model.
We must maintain a loop invariant during the abstraction refinement iterations: the set of inputs of the core driven by the shield is not k-dominant for the core. Without this loop invariant, every input of the core not driven by the shield might become kcontrolling in the next iteration of the abstraction refinement algorithm. To maintain the loop invariant, after including a kcontrolling variable into the shield, we move one-by-one the "oldest" variables (the variables that were included first) of the shield into the core, until the set of inputs of the core driven by the shield is no longer k-dominant.
If we do not find a k-controlling variable among the first three kcooperative variables, we simply add the head of the priority queue, a k-cooperative variable, to the shield of the abstract model. Note that we could have searched deeper in the priority queue for k-controlling variables. But since k-controllability analysis requires non-trivial BDD operations, checking only the first three variables in the priority queue for k-controllability makes a good tradeoff.
RELATED WORK
Kurshan first introduced the abstraction refinement algorithm and implemented it in the tool COSPAN [13] . But there is little published detail about the method.
Clarke et al [6] proposed an abstraction-refinement algorithm for ACTL* model checking. The method identifies in a counter example (1) the deadend states that are reachable from the initial states in the design and can reach the fail states in the abstract model, and (2) the bad states that are reachable from the initial states in the abstract model and can reach the fail states in the design. The method refines the abstract model to separate the deadend states from the bad states. It requires BDD-based image computation on the whole design, which severely limits its capacity. The methods in [5] and [7] were designed to fix this capacity problem by applying SAT solvers and ILP solvers to identify deadend states and pick minimal refinement to separate the deadend states from the bad states. However, in our experience, when the design is large, running SAT solvers on the whole design is often time consuming and likely to produce many conflict clauses that do not help zero in on good refinement candidates for proving the property. Experimental results in [19] seem to agree with this observation.
The RFN method in [20] was designed to verify large real-world designs by avoiding expensive computations on the whole design. It also applies a BDD-ATPG hybrid method to find counter examples on bigger abstract models, which limits RFN to only consider the set of counter examples that can be represented by a single sequence of cubes, or a partial input trace. The method in this paper is basically an improvement of RFN by controllability and cooperativeness analysis. We compare our algorithm against RFN in Section 5.
The work in [8] enhanced RFN by (1) considering multiple counter examples represented by a sequence of BDDs instead of cubes to identify refinement candidates and (2) performing refinement at a finer granularity ---in terms of logic gates rather than registers with their whole combinational transitive fan-ins.
The method GRAB in [19] picks the refinement variables by analyzing all shortest counter examples represented as a sequence of BDDs called synchronous onion rings (SORs). GRAB scores each design register that is an input of the abstract model based on a game-theoretic formula that estimates how many transitions within the SOR the variable can invalidate if it was under the control of player 2. The abstract model is then augmented with the variables with the highest scores until the whole set of SORs is invalidated. The controllable predecessor predicate used in our k-controllability analysis is similar to the game-theoretic formula of GRAB. The major differences between the two methods are: (1) a k-controlling variable may not get the highest score from the game-theoretic formula of GRAB and the variable getting the highest score may not be a k-controlling variable, (2) the kcontrollability analysis is independent of the SORs and (3) GRAB does not try to analyze the rest of the design as what kcooperativeness analysis does using 3-value simulation. We implemented this method for the experiments in Section 5.
In [1] and [2] a predicate similar to the controllability predecessor predicate is used for the purpose of compositional verification but not abstraction refinement.
Refinement is selected based on proofs rather than counter examples in [9] and [17] . The abstract models consist of the clauses that are involved in refutation proofs generated by the SAT solvers. Our method does not rely on running SAT solvers on the whole design to identify refinement candidates.
Interpolation-based reachability analysis [14] is an automatic abstraction method that is not based on abstraction refinement. It has drawn lots of interests lately because of its promising results on verifying some large designs. We compare the performance of an implementation [4] of this method in the next section.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We compared an implementation of our method, CNTL, against (1) RFN, an implementation of the algorithm in [20] , (2) mGrab, an implementation of the GRAB algorithm in [19] , and (3) INT, an implementation [4] of the interpolation method in [14] . Note that our implementations may not be as effective as the original implementations.
The comparison is based on 7 properties specified for 6 real-world designs. All properties are True, as we are more interested in comparing the property verification capabilities of the four methods. All experiments were done on SUN workstations with 750MHz SPARC processors and 4G-byte main memory running Solaris 5.8 OS. We set a time limit of 10 CPU hours. The experimental results are shown in Table 1 . The first column of Table 1 shows the names of the properties. The second column shows the numbers of gates and registers in the cone of influence (COI) of each property (the sequential transitive fan-in cone of the fail variable). The third through the sixth columns show the runtimes of the four methods on those properties.
On average our method CNTL is 3.4x faster than RFN. Both methods however managed to prove all properties. The mGrab program completed one proof within the time limit. We make the following observations. First, the time taken for input scoring is directly proportional to the number of inputs in the abstract model as well as the length of the SORs. Both quantities can grow rapidly as the abstract models grow. In our experiments, an abstract model with 10 registers could have 60 to 760 inputswhile the length of SORs ranged from 16 to 100. The mGrab program spent a lot of time scoring these inputs. Second, mGrab spent a significant amount of time computing the SORs.
INT is on average 10.3x faster than CNTL on the properties p2 and p3, but did not complete the proofs for the other 5 properties. Our impression is that since the interpolation method uses SAT engines that make decisions for each gate of the COI, its effectiveness tend to be impacted by the number of gates in the COI (INT did not terminate on COI with more than 70K gates).
On the other hand, the complexity of the abstract models impacts the effectiveness of CNTL and RFN more than the size of the COI (only 3-value simulation and limited sequential ATPG were performed on the COI). Thus we think that the abstraction refinement methods may be more scalable than the interpolation method. INT proved the properties p2 and p3 with COI of 697 and 4986 registers respectively, which clearly outperformed any BDD-based methods. Thus we think that INT could serve as a powerful alternative proof engine for verifying the abstract model during abstraction refinement. Table 2 shows the number of registers in the abstract models generated by the three abstraction refinement methods. The first column shows the names of the properties. The second column shows the number of registers in the abstract models generated by CNTL. The third column shows the number of k-controllable variables found during abstraction refinement. The fourth and fifth columns show the number of registers in the abstract models generated by RFN and mGrab respectively. RFN on average uses about 49% more registers than CNTL to prove the properties, which means that CNTL provides better abstraction efficiency. In general mGrab selected fewer registers than CNTL before the time out. As mentioned above, the scoring of each input of the abstract models and the construction of the SORs bogged down the performance of mGrab. Table 2 also shows that between 33 and 100 percent of the variables that CNTL included in the abstract models are both kcontrollable and k-cooperative. The rest of the variables are k-cooperative only. The abstract model that CNTL built for property p3 has the lowest percentage of k-controllable variables (33 percent); property p3 is also the only property that CNTL built a bigger abstract model and took more time to prove than RFN. Our conjecture is that the more k-controllable variables can be found, the more efficient CNTL is compared to RFN.
CONCLUSIONS
We introduce k-controllability analysis, a counter-example independent analysis that identifies variables that have the potential to invalidate all shortest counter examples; and kcooperativeness analysis, a counter-example dependent analysis that identifies variables whose transition functions invalidate some counter examples. The k-controllability is computed by BDD operations on the abstract models and k-cooperativeness is computed by 3-value simulation on the whole design. We present an abstraction refinement algorithm that utilizes both kcontrollability and k-cooperativeness analysis to better refine the abstract model for formally verifying safety properties.
We compared the algorithm against three automatic abstraction methods, RFN [20] , GRAB [19] and the interpolation method [14] , on 7 real-world properties. We found that the new method is on average 3.4x faster in runtime and 49% better in abstraction efficiency than RFN. The new method proved more properties than our implementations of the GRAB and the interpolation method. Since automatic abstraction is the key for verifying large designs, we believe that this method will make a positive impact to formal property verification.
This method may be improved by (1) more efficient kcontrollability analysis and more accurate k-cooperativeness analysis and (2) using GRAB's game-theoretic formula to rank a subset of the k-cooperative variables in the priority queue when no k-controllable variable was found.
